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Brilliance Revisited
Daniel A. Farber*
A year ago, I published a short essay entitled The Case
Against Brilliance1 in these pages. My thesis was that current
scholarly standards place too much emphasis on "brilliance"-a
word I used to describe clever but highly counterintuitive theo-
ries-at the expense of common sense. I suggested several rea-
sons for believing that brilliant scholarship in either law or
economics is unlikely to be valid.
Law review articles are normally greeted by deafening si-
lence, so I was unprepared for the flood of correspondence I re-
ceived. The response was favorable except for letters from
those who either considered themselves "brilliant" or aspired to
that condition. The essay reached an even broader audience
when part of it was reprinted in The New Republic.2 Another
flood of correspondence resulted.
The latest response to Brilliance is an article by Professor
Pierre Schlag in the Stanford Law Review attacking my thesis.3
Because my essay was deliberately written in an elliptical, hu-
morous style, I cannot very well complain that Professor Schlag
and other readers sometimes missed my point or found holes in
arguments intended to be only heuristic. The important issue is
not whether they misread my essay. Instead, the issue is the
validity of my suggestion that current standards for evaluating
legal scholarship are perverse in honoring the "brilliantly"
novel and counterintuitive rather than the sensible. In the
course of explaining my views on this subject, I will attempt to
show why Professor Schlag's criticisms are unfounded.
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Visiting
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 1987-1988. Dianne Farber, Phil
Frickey, Roger Park, and Gerald Torres made helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
1. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986).
2. Farber, Too Clever by Half, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1986, at 11.
3. Schlag, The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV.
917 (1987).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. THE STERILITY OF BRILLIANCE
Anyone who thumbs through a leading law review is likely
to find at least one brilliant article.4 Several examples were
given in Brilliance,5 but just to demonstrate that those weren't
flukes, here are a few more:
An article in the University of Chicago Law Review suggests that the
Lochner Court may have been too timid in its crusade against eco-
nomic regulation.
6
An article in the Harvard Law Review argues that Judge Posner's
economic theory of law must be rejected because it conflicts with the
views expressed in one of the author's favorite novels.7
Another article in the Harvard Law Review asserts that the only re-
maining traces of civic virtue and self-government in our society are
found in the Supreme Court.
8
4. One reason for this situation is discussed in another short essay, Far-
ber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 307 (1986).
5. Farber, supra note 1, at 918-23 (economic theories of Coase, Buchanan,
and others); 924-25 (constitutional theories of Ely and Dworkin).
6. See Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 703, 734 (1984):
Ironically, the real difficulty, squarely raised by Lochner, runs in
quite the opposite direction. Lochner may well have given too much
scope to the police power, for it can be argued that there is no reason
to interfere with freedom of contract, even for reasons of health,
where no third-party interests are at stake.... The danger [of legisla-
tive "rent-seeking"] suggests, rather, that even health or safety meas-
ures may be attacked, notwithstanding the soundness of their ends,
where the means chosen sweep too broadly.
Id. (emphasis in original). An earlier passage states that the "police power
limitation on the contract clause may be no more than a means for the state to
protect against such private abuse" as exists "when two parties make an agree-
ment to violate the rights of a third." Id. at 732.
7. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 384 (1985). The oddity here is obviously not the disagreement with Pos-
ner but the reliance on Kafka. For reflections on whether Kafka's view of the
world really is inconsistent with Judge Posner's economic theory of law, see
the later exchange between Posner and West: Posner, The Ethical Signifi-
cance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986);
West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1449 (1986). I fail to see how Posner's possible inconsistency with
Kafka is any more probative than Darwin's inconsistency with the Bible.
8. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1986). Admittedly, it's hard to believe that anyone as smart as Michelman
would take such a position, but how else can one interpret passages like the
following?
[A]s a result, the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, seem to
take on as one of their ascribed functions the modeling of active self-
government that citizens find practically beyond reach. Unable as a
nation to practice our own self-government (in the full, positive
[Vol. 72:367
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In giving these examples, my point is not to suggest that
there is anything wrong with the authors of these articles. They
are highly intelligent, learned individuals; each has done other
work of great value. It is hardly surprising when mediocre
scholars go astray, but these are first-class minds. Where did
they go wrong?
There are countless ways that clever people can reach ab-
surd conclusions. To demonstrate the sterility of brilliance, I
would have to analyze each brilliant article fully to show that it
is either false or devoid of significance. Not only would this be
a time-consuming and tedious endeavor, but it also would in
some sense take these articles too seriously and thereby help to
legitimate them.9 Admittedly, however, my "hit and run" at-
tacks on various scholarly works in Brilliance seem to have left
readers such as Schlag unclear about my reasoning. As a com-
promise, then, I will analyze at some length a paradigm case of
brilliance.
Let's take a closer look at one of the examples used in Bril-
liance :10 the argument that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery11 established a constitutional
right to welfare. 12 To avoid repeatedly referring to the authors
by name, which might give the impression that this is a per-
sonal attack on them, let's just use their initials and call this
sense), we-or at any rate we of the "reasoning class"--can at least
identify with the judiciary's as we idealistically construct it.
Id. at 74. Or consider this passage:
[Fjor citizens of the United States, national politics are not imaginably
the arena of self-government in its positive, freedom-giving sense....
Congress is not us. The President is not us. The Air Force is not us.
"We" are not "in" those bodies. Their determinations are not our self-
government.
Id. at 75.
9. As Professor Kelman recently suggested, taking an absurd idea seri-
ously (even while disputing it) may give it political and intellectual respecta-
bility when it deserves to be marginalized. Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously:
An Essay for Centrists, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1829, 1829-31, 1862 (1986).
10. Farber, supra note 1, at 926-29.
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (striking down the federal minimum wage as ap-
plied to state employees).
12. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 312-13 (1978);
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181-92 (1977); Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1075-76
(1977). I admit that I was seized by a moment of doubt while writing this sec-
tion. Perhaps I was setting up a straw man. Could Tribe and Michelman pos-
sibly have meant to take the position identified in the text? After carefully
rereading the cited passages, however, I see no other possible interpretation.
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the TM thesis. As is typical of brilliant arguments, the TM the-
sis turns conventional understanding upside down. What pur-
pose is served by doing so?
The most obvious possibility is that TM serves to establish
the following proposition:
TM/i: The opinion in National League of Cities is best interpreted
as support for a constitutional right to welfare.
3
TM/1 is clearly false. It is simply untenable to interpret
the Rehnquist opinion as having this meaning. I suppose this is
perfectly obvious, but if any doubts remain, consider the plausi-
bility of the following excerpt from a future biography of
Rehnquist:
National League of Cities was, as a few perceptive critics of the day
foresaw, the opening salvo in Rehnquist's campaign for a constitu-
tional right to welfare. Despite the temporary setback of Garcia,
which overruled National League of Cities, Rehnquist continued his
struggle to protect the poor. Finally, he succeeded in garnering ma-
jority support for his position in Smith v. Department of Agriculture,
in which he held unconstitutional a cutback in food stamp benefits.
As his opinion in Smith pointed out, a desire to balance the federal
budget cannot justify further disadvantaging the most impoverished
members of society. No astute reader of National League of Cities
should be surprised that Smith relies almost entirely on John Rawls's
Theory of Justice as a basis for construing the fourteenth amendment.
Okay, but don't we know from modern literary criticism,
deconstruction, and so on, that "authorial intention" has noth-
ing to do with interpretation of texts? Rather than debating
the merits of these interpretative theories, I prefer to show
their irrelevance. The paragraph from the Rehnquist biogra-
phy is easily rewritten to avoid any mention of Rehnquist's sub-
jective intentions. The crucial move is to replace references to
Rehnquist's actual authorship of the opinions with references
to the texts themselves. One important line of the National
League of Cities opinion reads: "Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court." So, consider the following from a fu-
ture book about the Rehnquist opinions by a prominent literary
theorist:
A recurrent theme in the "Rehnquist" cycle of texts is the establish-
ment of a constitutional right to welfare. This theme first emerged in
the National League of Cities text and was repeated more explicitly
in a line of later texts culminating in the statement in Smith v. De-
partment of Agriculture that "[t]he Constitution does not permit the
federal budget to be balanced on the backs of the poor."
13. All the best philosophers these days abbreviate and number the pro-
positions they discuss.
[Vol. 72:367
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As a description of future Rehnquist opinions, this is no more
plausible than the fragment from the hypothetical Rehnquist
biography.
Furthermore, it does not help in establishing the TM thesis
to say, as Professor Schlag suggests, that simply because Rehn-
quist didn't think "with or pursuant to those theories," he
might still "think in accordance with these ideas."'14 If Rehn-
quist thinks in "accordance with" the TM thesis, then we would
expect his future conduct to conform with that thesis, as he
continues to think in accordance with (but not pursuant to)
TM. If so, we would expect him to take a favorable view of
constitutional welfare rights. Of course, we don't actually ex-
pect this at all.
Professor Schlag would say, presumably, that all I have
shown thus far is that the TM thesis lacks "representational ac-
curacy."'1 5 According to Schlag, "our sense that a theory offers
an interpretation or an explanation, not merely a recapitulation
of what has already transpired, depends upon a critical distan-
cing between the theory and the conventional practice of its
subject matter.' 6 "The virtue of brilliance," he maintains, "is
that it achieves at once a great distance from the conventional
understanding and yet returns to shed a stronger light on the
subject matter."17 From Professor Schlag's perspective, then,
the counterfactual nature of the TM thesis is an asset. But if
the TM thesis is not intended to be "representationally accu-
rate" (i.e., true), just what light can it shed on its subject
matter?
If the TM thesis is untenable as an interpretation of the
Rehnquist opinion, perhaps the thesis can be salvaged in some
other way. For example, the creators of TM could use National
League of Cities as a premise on which to base a logical infer-
ence. Rather than making claims about what the opinion
means, they might be arguing about what the opinion logically
14. Schlag, supra note 3, at 923 n.17 (emphasis omitted).
15. See id. at 922.
16. Id. at 921. In a sense this is quite correct. A linguist's account of a
language's grammar doesn't have to be comprehensible to the ordinary
speaker of the language; in fact, a good theory probably won't be. But the the-
ory can't contradict the actual usage of ordinary speakers. Similarly, a success-
ful semantic theory could not posit that the word "apple" really refers to
oranges, although it could offer an explanation for the connection between the
word "apple" and the actual piece of fruit that most people would not under-
stand. The TM thesis doesn't successfully explain Rehnquist's meaning be-
cause it contradicts what it seeks to explain.
17. Id. at 921 n.9.
1987r1
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
entails. These alternatives are not at all equivalent because we
may intend a meaning without knowing of or being willing to
agree with its logical consequences. So let's try this form of the
TM thesis:
TM/2: Proposition P ("National League of Cities was correctly de-
cided.") implies proposition Q ("There is a constitutional right to
welfare.").
Unlike TM/1, TM/2 is surprising but not crazy.
Although TM/2 conceivably could be true,'8 its significance
is unclear. What would one accomplish by establishing the
truth of TM/2? It certainly would be an amusing irony (well
worth a humorous fifteen-page essay) if Rehnquist's opinion
implied the existence of a constitutional right to welfare. But
most legal writing, almost certainly including the TM articles,
is intended to do more than amuse. Presumably, the TM idea
was to use the authority of National League of Cities to estab-
lish the validity of a constitutional right to welfare.
Obviously, this use of the opinion simply passes by those of
us who don't agree with National League of Cities.19 It follows,
therefore, that the argument must be addressed to readers like
Justice Rehnquist who do believe in the validity of National
League of Cities. Imagine poor Rehnquist, forced by ines-
capable logic to support a constitutional right to welfare!
Luckily for the current Chief Justice, even if TM/2 were
valid, he could easily escape the trap so cleverly laid for him.
The easiest escapes would be simply to ignore the problem
(Rehnquist doesn't like to cite law review articles anyway) or
to revise the rationale for National League of Cities in a way
that avoids TM/2. These escape routes would be so easy, how-
ever, that using them seems almost unfair.
More sporting responses are available. Rehnquist could
simply renounce National League of Cities. If TM could accom-
plish such a result, it might have some value after all, even
though that result is not one intended by TM's creators. Alter-
natively, Rehnquist could renounce strict adherence to logic.
18. In fact, as a matter of technical logic, I believe that TM/2 is true. In
my opinion P is false because National League of Cities was not correctly de-
cided. According to logicians, if P is false, "P implies Q" is true for any propo-
sition Q. See W. QUINE, METHODS OF LOGIC 13-16, 24 (rev. ed. 1959). So in a
trivial sense TM/2 is true.
19. I suppose the alliance between welfare rights and National League of
Cities may also serve to discredit the idea of a constitutional right to welfare.
Perhaps one reason why National League of Cities is a bad opinion is that it
logically entails untenable consequences.
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As in the past when logic seemed to have him backed into a
corner, he could walk calmly away from the trap while reciting
Holmes's adage that the life of the law is not logic but experi-
ence.20 I'm not sure which of these approaches Rehnquist
would take, but I would bet heavily on any of them as against
his surrender to TM and constitutional welfare rights.
Lawyers are more impressed by experience than by logic in
part because they know perfectly well that any chain of argu-
ment has a weak link. Thus, Rehnquist could simply find a
flaw somewhere in the TM argument. The basic problem with
TM/2 is the idea that the sheer force of a complicated logical
argument will (and should) persuade people to adopt conclu-
sions they regard as ridiculous. Efforts to overwhelm readers
with sheer logic are found not just in law but in other fields
such as philosophy. As Robert Nozick has pointed out:
A philosophical argument is an attempt to get someone to believe
something, whether he wants to believe it or not. A successful philo-
sophical argument, a strong argument, forces someone to a belief.
Though philosophy is carried on as a coercive activity, the penalty
philosophers wield is, after all, rather weak. If the other person is
willing to bear the label of "irrational" or "having the worse argu-
ments", he can skip away happily maintaining his previous belief. He
will be trailed, of course, by the philosopher furiously hurling philo-
sophical imprecations .... 21
Because we evaluate abstract theories largely by examining
their concrete implications, there is little reason to abandon
strongly held concrete beliefs simply because they conflict with
theory.22 No matter how clever the argument for TM/2 may
be, it isn't actually going to convince anyone who didn't buy the
20. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J.). Rehnquist adopted the Holmes approach:
There is no denying that the strict logic of the more recent cases lim-
iting the Government's liability to pay damages for riparian access, if
carried to its ultimate conclusion, might completely swallow up any
private claim for "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment
even in a situation as different from the riparian condemnation cases
as this one. But, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed in a very different
context, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.
Id. at 177.
21. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 4 (1981) (emphasis in
original).
22. See D. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 223 (1985). This view about
the limits of legal theory is developed at greater length in Farber & Frickey,
Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. (1987) (forth-
coming). See also Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (describing an evolutionary reconciliation of principles
and practices).
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conclusion to begin with.23
The flaw in TM/2 is not just that it won't persuade Rehn-
quist, but that it shouldn't. He has many reasons to believe
that no constitutional right to welfare exists; this belief is
tightly connected with his entire system of thought. Even if he
cannot immediately see a flaw in the TM argument, he can ra-
tionally decide that the probability that such a flaw will later
be found exceeds the likelihood that welfare rights exist. Even
the best logical argument will not persuade him that the sun
rises in the west, because his belief to the contrary is strongly
rooted in his experience.24
A Dworkinian interpretation of the type Schlag defends,25
by the way, is no more helpful in establishing the TM thesis.
Professor Ronald Dworkin contended that although the fram-
ers of the eighth amendment believed in the death penalty-it
was not part of their "conception" of cruel and unusual punish-
ment-they also had a "concept" of cruelty that may include
23. The reader will notice that I haven't criticized any of the actual rea-
soning used to support TM. I am quite willing to assume that every individual
step of the argument is rational and defensible. The creators of TM are ex-
tremely bright people. No doubt they could come up with equally cogent lines
of argument for any number of other crazy propositions if for some reason
they wanted to, including the following:
Dred Scott established that women have a constitutional right to vote.
Lochner established that Communists are protected by the first
amendment.
Miranda established the constitutional right to an abortion.
Each of the preceding cases established a constitutional right to
welfare.
Actually, the reader might enjoy trying one or two of these just for fun; it's
not really that hard. That someone can make a clever argument for an absurd
position is more a tribute to the writer's creativity than to the validity of the
position.
24. Some readers may find an analogy to Bayesian analysis helpful.
(Others will find the analogy utterly obscure.) Bayesian analysis is a method
of combining a prior estimate of a conclusion's probability with a new piece of
evidence to calculate a new estimate of the conclusion's likelihood given the
new evidence. (For more than you ever wanted to know about Bayesian anal-
ysis, see Symposium: Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66
B.U.L. REv. 377 (1987).) No matter how good a piece of evidence may be
(short of certain proof), a Bayesian will reject a conclusion if the prior esti-
mate of likelihood is low enough. For similar reasons Chief Justice Rehnquist
can rationally reject a conclusion which seems absurd even if he cannot imme-
diately disprove TM/2.
25. Schlag, supra note 3, at 919-20, 923 n.17.
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the death penalty.26 So perhaps Rehnquist's concept of state
sovereignty mandates a constitutional right to welfare even
though his conception of sovereignty excludes it. It is some-
thing of a mystery, however, how anyone could say either that
Rehnquist has such a concept or that a conception embodies a
concept that contradicts it. The only sense I can make of the
Dworkinian formulation is that Rehnquist's reasoning in Na-
tional League of Cities somehow leads to the TM thesis. This is
either just TM/2 all over again, or at best a sort of hybrid of
TM/1 and TM/2. Perhaps the Dworkinian formulation would
be illuminating to some eccentric who deeply admired Rehn-
quist's jurisprudence but thought Rehnquist had a blind spot
about constitutional welfare rights.
After further reflection, then, and despite the arguments
made by such critics as Schlag, I remain unable to see why ap-
parently absurd theses such as TM ought to be respected and
honored, as they so often seem to be.2 7 Still remaining, how-
ever, is the other half of the attack on Brilliance: the argu-
ment that common sense is somehow anti-intellectual and an
impediment to progress.
II. THE CASE FOR COMMON SENSE
Common sense may seem a rather obvious virtue, but it is
under heavy attack today as an enemy of both intellectual and
social progress. Neither of these attacks is well-founded.
The most frequent argument against common sense runs
something like this: If there is one thing we can be sure of, it is
that most of what we now find obvious will turn out to be false.
26. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). Dworkin says,
for example:
It would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the fact
that when the clause was adopted capital punishment was standard
and unquestioned. That would be decisive if the framers of the clause
had meant to lay down a particular conception of cruelty, because it
would show that the conception did not extend so far. But it is not
decisive of the different question the Court now faces, which is this:
Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of
cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make death cruel?
Id at 135-36.
27. Some responses to Brilliance took me to task for making fun of seri-
ous scholars who were only doing their best to find the truth. Frankly, I do
not see much sign of disinterested curiosity at work here; at least, it is a mar-
velous coincidence that each scholar's thesis was so congenial to his or her pre-
existing political views. I am not suggesting that there is anything in the
slightest improper about having an ideological motivation, but to defend polit-
ical advocacy as if it were disinterested scholarship is disingenuous.
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The history of modern thought is largely about the defeat of
common sense and its replacement by brilliant, counterintuitive
theories. It is common sense that space and time are the same
everywhere, but Einstein taught us that both are relative. To
argue for common sense is to be an intellectual reactionary.
For present purposes I am willing to accept the initial
premise that most of our "obvious truths" will someday turn
out to be false. Most of our current beliefs may well be re-
placed by brilliant, counterintuitive new ideas. Nevertheless, it
is a mistake to believe that this should encourage an eagerness
to abandon our current beliefs in favor of counterintuitive al-
ternatives. Although the odds may be against the conventional
wisdom, it may still be the best available bet if all other candi-
dates are real long shots.
Just for fun, here is a quantitative version of that argu-
ment. Suppose, for example, that two-thirds of our core beliefs
will turn out to be false. For any given core belief, there are
any number of counterintuitive alternatives-let's pick four as
a reasonably conservative guess. Now, what are the odds that
any one of those alternatives is correct? Two-thirds of the
time, one of them will be correct; all four are equally likely; so
any one alternative will be correct one-sixth (two-thirds times
one-fourth) of the time. Hence, the odds are two to one that
our conventional belief is false, but five to one that any particu-
lar alternative is false. Logically, we should have a strong pre-
sumption in favor of retaining our conventional beliefs. Even if
we think they are probably going to turn out to be false, any
given alternative is much more likely to be false. In other
words, even if it isn't a very strong candidate, the conventional
wisdom is still the best candidate for truth.
Thus, an eagerness to jettison the status quo cannot be de-
fended simply on the basis of the knowledge that better candi-
dates may come along. But, one might ask, isn't it important to
be open-minded and constantly ready to seek out better
alternatives?
Maybe not. Thomas Kuhn-the famous inventor of the
"paradigm shift"-was once asked to speak about the role of
creativity in science.28 Given his reputation, the audience must
have expected a talk about the importance of creativity in al-
lowing scientific revolutions to transcend the day-to-day scien-
28. See T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIEN-
TIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 225 (1977).
[Vol. 72:367
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tific work that Kuhn calls normal science.29
Actually, Kuhn said just the opposite. He suggested that a
dogged commitment to existing theory is a crucial scientific vir-
tue, without which science could not progress. 30 Open-minded,
overly creative scientists would give up on existing theories too
easily whenever a difficulty is encountered, rather than dedi-
cating themselves to working out problems within the confines
of existing thought. Hence, valid theories that may be worka-
ble would be too quickly abandoned in favor of unconventional
alternatives. Instead of steady progress, science would undergo
the periodic succession of fads that is typical of modern art.
Truly great breakthroughs, like Einstein's, would be lost in the
constant flux of novel theories. Indeed, it is the ability of a
highly novel theory like relativity to overcome the heavy pre-
sumption against it that gives us confidence in the theory's
validity.
This is perhaps a startling conclusion, but it is quite consis-
tent with the views of other philosophers. For example, Quine
has explained that conservatism is one of the prime virtues of a
theory:
Virtue I is conservatism. In order to explain the happenings that we
are inventing it to explain, the hypothesis may have to conflict with
some of our previous beliefs; but the fewer the better. Acceptance of
a hypothesis is of course like acceptance of any belief in that it de-
mands rejection of whatever conflicts with it. The less rejection of
prior beliefs required, the more plausible the hypothesis-other
things being equal.
Conservatism is rather effortless on the whole, having inertia in
its favor. But it is sound strategy too, since at each step it sacrifices as
little as possible of the evidential support, whatever that may have
been, that our overall system of beliefs has hitherto been enjoying.
The truth may indeed be radically remote from our present system of
beliefs, so that we may need a long series of conservative steps to at-
tain what might have been attained in one rash leap. The longer the
leap, however, the more serious an angular error in the direction. For
a leap in the dark the likelihood of a happy landing is severely lim-
ited. Conservatism holds out the advantages of limited liability and a
maximum of live options for each next move.
31
The knowledge that we have so often been wrong in the past
cures dogmatism, but our past errors are no reason to embrace
29. This is the common reading (misreading, in my opinion) of his most
famous work, T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
30. See KUHN, supra note 28, at 234-36.
31. W. QUINE & J. ULLIAM, THE WEB OF BELIEF 66-68 (2d ed. 1978).
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intellectual change for its own sake. New ideas, in short, have
to pay their dues.
Even beyond the general presumption in favor of conven-
tional wisdom supported by Kuhn and Quine, conventional
legal wisdom merits deference as the collective understanding
of the members of our tribe about our own tribal customs.32 To
some extent, this conventional understanding constitutes law.
What Rehnquist and his readers thought he meant in National
League of Cities can't be different from the true meaning of the
opinion because the meaning of an utterance is defined by the
users of the language. Moreover, the conventional understand-
ing is also persuasive empirical evidence of how law works be-
cause it reflects the common experiences of numerous
32. To get away from our own society for the moment, imagine a legal an-
thropologist (call him Bill Brilliant) studying an Amazon tribe called the
Rebraf. The Rebraf, though quite untechnological, have a highly developed
legal system. Bill returns home and, after many months of research into legal
theory, writes a major article for the Harvard Law Review pointing out that
the Rebraf don't understand their own legal system.
For example, Bill explains, the orders given by a Rebraf judge are always
carried out instantly and with no dispute as to their meaning, whereas decon-
structive analysis shows that their content is quite indeterminate. Also, in one
case, a judge allied closely with the tribal chief awarded the chief possession of
a banana tree. Analysis of the judge's explanation revealed that he had actu-
ally established a tribal right to free mangos. Yet when Bill questioned his in-
formants, they all laughed at this analysis. The judge also relied on a tribal
myth about the creation of bananas, which Bill found wholly irrelevant to the
case, although the members of the tribe all found the explanation quite satis-
fying. Indeed, Bill concluded on the basis of his jurisprudential readings that
the Rebraf were mistaken about nearly all of their legal system. Inspired by
the success of this investigation, Bill returned to his notes and found that the
Rebraf don't even have their own language right. For example, they gave
"zpin" as the plural of "zpan" (the word for banana), whereas the real plural
is "zpat."
Something is obviously badly wrong with Bill's analysis. The way the
Rebraf speak their own language can't be wrong; by definition, the Rebraf lan-
guage is whatever the Rebraf speak. But Bill's legal analysis has similar
problems. Bill's interpretive theory is that Rebraf legal orders are indetermi-
nate. But how can the meaning of something be indeterminate when in fact
speakers and listeners all agree on a single meaning? If all the speakers of a
language agree on how to use a word, Bill can't very well say that they are all
making a mistake about its meaning-like the grammar of the language, its se-
mantics is defined by their practice. The Rebraf can't be mistaken about the
contents of their own culture any more than they can about their language.
(Imagine Bill trying to straighten them out: "I know you all think it is the
Rebraf custom to award banana trees to the chief, but you're wrong. I'm tell-
ing you that the Rebraf custom is to give the trees to the medicine man, and
you'd better do it that way if you want to be right.") Bill can of course argue
that tribal customs and beliefs ought to be changed; what he can't reasonably
do is argue that everyone but him is wrong about their present content.
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members of the tribe. We should not reject it without powerful
reasons.
But isn't common sense itself inevitably politically reac-
tionary? To have genuine social change, don't we need to tran-
scend the commonplace view of reality, which is part of our
oppressive social structure?
It is at least questionable whether we need to get beyond
common sense to see what is wrong with our society. Do we re-
ally need to understand words like poverty, bigotry, and vio-
lence in exotic new ways to find fault with our society? Is the
status quo really beyond criticism on its own terms, so that we
need to find some radical new post-structuralist vantage point
before a critique is possible?
If our society is to be criticized, I think, it is on the basis of
quite ordinary reality-infant mortality rates, unemployment,
violence, and homelessness.3 3 Does it really take a deep under-
standing of literary criticism to understand the need to change
such things? To talk about the indeterminacy of language is
only to conceal the all too determinate realities. Those who
seek social change but concede that common sense is against
them have made a serious mistake.
Much of what I have written so far, in a sense, begs the
question Schlag raises. I have suggested reasons for doubting
the truth of brilliant arguments, but this of course assumes that
truth is the main goal of scholarship.
If I read Professor Schlag correctly, this is the basic source
of our disagreement. While I believe that truth is the key to
good scholarship, he seems to view truth as only one of a
number of equally valid goals. Schlag criticizes me for ascrib-
ing "an overly narrow role to theory" and thereby making
"overly stringent demands" on it.3 4 Space does not permit me
to discuss why I think truth is so important, but at least I
should clarify what I mean when I say truth should be the
main test of good scholarship.
The truth of a work of scholarship can't be determined
without knowing exactly what the work claims. For example,
Coase can't be criticized for ignoring transaction costs-which
33. Radical scholars may consider these to be trivial social defects, hardly
worth mentioning compared to our "real" social problems.
34. Schlag, supra note 3, at 921-22. When he considers my views, how-
ever, he doesn't seem to care whether they have any of the "aesthetic" virtues
he discusses; he just wants to prove that I'm wrong. This seems inconsistent
with his own intellectual standards.
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Schlag seems to think I am arguing 5-because he explicitly as-
sumed them away. But Coase did purport to tell us what would
happen without transaction costs. He concluded that any legal
rule would be equally compatible with economic efficiency:
In earlier sections, when dealing with the problem of the rearrange-
ment of legal rights through the market, it was argued that such a re-
arrangement would be made through the market whenever this
would lead to an increase in the value of production. But this as-
sumed costless market transactions. Once the costs of carrying out
market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a re-
arrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in
the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater
than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about. When it
is less, the granting of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would
be granted) or the liability to pay damages may result in an activity
being discontinued (or may prevent its being started) which would be
undertaken if market transactions were costless. In these conditions
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the effi-
ciency with which the economic system operates.
3 6
Essentially, Coase's thesis is that in the absence of transaction
costs, people would achieve a unique, economically efficient al-
location of resources. If this thesis is false, then he can no
longer evaluate legal rules by using this hypothetical allocation
as a benchmark, and his entire argument collapses.
Thus, the thesis of an article need not be a direct claim
that a given proposition P about the legal system is true. In-
stead, the thesis might be "P is an interesting alternative per-
spective," "P reveals something ironic or amusing about the
system," "P is a useful but rough approximation," or "P isn't
true of our current practice, so we should change our prac-
tice."' 37 But whatever claim the article does make about P, that
claim should be assessed on the basis of its truthfulness.
In short, I am not arguing for dry factual accuracy as op-
posed to imagination, wit, and passion. Instead, to my mind, the
35. See id. at 922-32.
36. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960). Per-
haps as Schlag suggests, Coase may have changed his mind about whether the
statement quoted above is true. See Schlag, supra note 3, at 922-23. This does
not, however, alter the meaning of what he said in 1960. (In fairness to Coase,
I should probably add that although the article is famous for this "Coase Theo-
rem," it also had a more sensible point that policy analysts should not base de-
cisions on a comparison of real-world market activities with an ideal and hence
unrealistic model of governmental regulation. See Coase, supra, at 43. But it
would hardly have taken a 43 page article to make that point.)
37. The Case Against Brilliance is a little bit of all of these, which is one
reason Professor Schlag's intense scrutiny of a few passages of the article
strikes me as largely beside the point.
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real question is whether a work exhibits what my colleague Ir-
ving Younger calls the "play of intelligence":
Good legal writing comes from the head. You must see through and
around your subject, measuring it by more than one measuring stick,
turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just and clear-headed assess-
ment of its position in the hierarchy of things.
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is "detach-
ment," understood as a certain amusement with the enterprise upon
which you are engaged, a sense of humor about yourself and your
works. If a lawyer has it, the lawyer's writing will unfailingly com-
municate the play of intelligence ("play" here being as important as
"intelligence"). It is the play of intelligence that brings legal writing
to life, holding a reader's attention and eliciting his assent.38
Whatever the other virtues of brilliant articles, and despite the
high I.Q.'s of their authors, it is precisely this play of intelli-
gence that is missing from this genre of contemporary legal
scholarship.
Arthur Leff once said that scholars live "for those occa-
sional moments when they say, in some concise and illuminat-
ing way, something that appears to be true."39  It doesn't
embarrass me, any more than it seems to have embarrassed
Leff, that I can't define truth.40 Like Leff, I believe that truth,
rather than novelty, is the "first virtue"41 of scholarship.42
38. Younger, Let's Get Serious, 73 A.B.A. J. 110, 110 (1987).
39. Leff, Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981). As he went on to say,
"[To have crafted, on occasion, something true and truly put-whatever the
devil else legal scholarship is, is from, or is for, it's the joy of that too." Id.; see
also Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEo. L.J. 1, 3-7 (1986)
(describing scholarship's pursuit of truth); Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholar-
ship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 966-68 (1981) (characterizing
scholarship by its preoccupation with the discovery of truth).
40. Fortunately, a theory of truth isn't needed to apply the word cor-
rectly. (I say "fortunately" because we would probably be unable to speak at
all if we were required to have adequate theoretical underpinnings for our use
of language.) Indeed, I doubt very much that a useful theory of truth is possi-
ble. See A. FINE, THE SHAKY GAME: EINSTEIN, REALISM, AND THE QUANTUM
THEORY 9, 127-35, 148-49 (1986); R. RORTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMA-
TISM xv, xxv, 162-66 (1982).
41. As John Rawls wrote:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected
or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are
unjust.
J. RAiwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971).
42. Professor Schlag suggests that under my standards, much of "legal re-
alism, law and economics, CLS, feminist jurisprudence, law and society, and
grand theory would have to be dismissed from the intellectual panorama of
the legal academic." Schlag, supra note 3, at 920. Undoubtedly, some of the
work in each of these genres, like much mainstream work, fails to meet my
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standards, but I see no reason to assume that any of these forms of scholarship
is inherently incompatible with the play of intelligence.
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